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Dec. 1966]

IN .RE JOHNSON
(65 C.2d 393; 54 Cal.Rptr. 873. 420 P.2d 393]

[Crim. No. 10193.

In Bank.
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Dec. 2, 1966.]

In re JOHN WELLINGTON JOHNSON on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review a sentence in
excess of that permitted by law and to correct the judgment
so that it will impose the only punishment lawful under the
undisputed ~acts.
[2] Poisons-megal Sale of Narcotics.-In a prosecution for Ulllawful sales of heroin, though the number of deliveries may
be relevant in determining the number of crimes committed, the
number of deliveries is not conclusive; the entire transaction
must be considered. Where, in negotiating a sale of heroin to
an undercover agent, one price was agreed on and defendant
intended from the outset to sell either 10 spoons for $250 nr
five spoons for $150, and where the heroin was delivered in
two installments SUbstantially contemporaneous in time only
because the agent wished to try the "stuff" before buying, only
one crime was committed.
[8] Oriminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment: PoisonsIllegal Sale of Narcotics-Punishment.-The basic principle
that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act precluded in:ftiction, in a narcotic prosecution, of more than one
punishment for a series of acts directed toward one criminal
objective, the single sale of heroin, delivered in two installments, to one customer at a price agreed on at the outset.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from custody. Writ granted in part to vacate and set aside judgment
and sentence on one count of the information; order to show
. cause discharged and writ denied in all other respects.
John Wellington Johnson, in pro. per., and RobertC. Anderson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Harold F. Bradford, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 41; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus
(1st ed § 59).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 34(5)(b); [2J Poisons, § 10.1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1475; Poisons, § 16.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1963 a jury found petitioner guilty
of two counts of unlawfully selling heroin' (Health & Safe
Code, § 11501) and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences. In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that
the prosecution's evidence at the trial established that the acts
charged and 'adjudged as two separate sales were in fact and
law parts of a single transaction constituting only one offense.
[1] Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review a sentence
in excess of that permitted by law (In re Ward, 64 Ca1.2d
672, 675 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; In re Seeley, 29
Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24]) and to correct the jUdgment so that
it will impose the only punishment lawful under the undisputed facts. (Neal v. State of Cal'ifornia, 55 Cal.2d 11, 17 [9
Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].)
The convictions of two sales of heroin rest on the following
undispute~ facts: On November 8, 1962, Billie Robertson, an
undercover agent for the state narcotic enforcement bureau,
arranged to meet petitioner at a bar. They met at 9 p.m. and
discussed a sale of heroin to Robertson for $30 a spoon (approximately two grams). Robertson said, "I'll take a spoon
. . . and if it's good I'll take the five spoons for $30.00 a
spoon. " Petitioner said, "I'll trust you and . . . you can
try it out·and then give me the bread [money] . . . . If it's no
good you can bring the stuff back. . . . I'll tell you what I'll
'do . . . I'll give you another five [and] . . . it will only cost
you $250.00 for ten spoons." Petitioner left to "get the
stuff. " Shortly thereafter Robertson met him and he delivered
"five spoons" so that Robertson could "try it out." Robertson took the "stuff" to other narcotics agents; they tested it
and found that it was an opiate. Robertson telephoned petitioner and agreed to meet him again at 11 p.m. and pay him
$150 for the five "spoons." Petitioner asked whether Robertson wanted "the other five for another $100" and Robertson
said, "Yeah man, but I don't have the bread [money] right
now. I'll take it if you'll trust me until tomorrow." Petitioner agreed. At the 11 p.m. meeting Robertson gave petitioner $150 for the five "spoons" that petitioner had already
delivered, and petitioner delivered five more "spoons." The
other agents, who had waited near by, then arrested petitioner.
The agreed balance of $100, of course, was never paid.
[2] Petitioner's course of criminal conduct during the two
hours from 9 until 11 p.m. was a single transaction. It was
only because the agent wished to try out some of the "stuff"
before buying that the heroin was delivp.rp-d in two instaUments instead of one. Furthermore, the two acts of delivery
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were substantially contemporaneous in time. Although the
number of deliveries may be relevant in determining the
number of crimes committed, it is not conclusive. The entire
transaction must be considered. To find that the two deliveries
in this case constituted separate crimes, it would be necessary
to attach independent criminal significance. to the bifurcation .
of the delivery, a circumstance that had nothing to do with
petitioner's culpability. Since one price was agreed upon at
the outset and since petitioner intended from the outset to sell
Robertson either 10 spoons for $250 or five spoons for $150, he
intended to make but one sale. Moreover, that sale was not
carried, out over such an extended period of time that -the
bifurcation of delivery posed separate, independent dangers.
Under these circumstances, no legitimate penal purpose would
be served by interpreting section 11501 to permit the prosecutor to carve this transaction into two crimes.
[3] The basic principle that forbids multiple punishment
. for one criminal act (see People v. Quinn, 61 Ca1.2d 551, 555
[39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705] ; People v. Tideman, 57 Cal.
2d 574, 585 [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007]; People v.
Logan,41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 20] ; People v. Knowles,
35 Ca1.2d 175, 188 [217 P.2d 1]) precludes infliction of more
than one punishment for the present series of acts directed
toward one criminal objective, the single sale of heroin to one
customer. (See Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11,
18, fn. 1; People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 483, 491 [254 P.2d 501]
[possession and transportation of heroin necessarily incident
to sale] ; People v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 '[233 P.2d
897] [obtaining cash and automobile in exchange for used automobile in one transaction held but one theft]; People v.
Twedt, 1 Cal.2d 392, 397 [35 P.2d 324] [offering for sale,
negotiating for the sale of, and selling securities held one
offense Under the Corporate Securities Act]; People v. Clemett, 208 Cal. 142, 14;5 [280 P. 681] [possession, control, and
operation of a still held one offense].)
The judgment and sentence on count two of the information
are vacated and set aside. The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for habeas corpus is in all other
respects denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
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